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THE RISE OF FUNCTIONS* 
by Salornon Bochner 
Summary. The heart of analysis is the concept of function, and functions 
"belong" to analysis, even if, nowadays, they occur everywhere and any- 
where, in and out of mathematics, in thought, cognition, even perception. 
Functions came into being in "modern" mathematics, that is, in mathe- 
matics since the Renaissance. By a rough division into centuries, the 17th 
and 18th centuries made various preparations, the 19th century created 
functions of one variable, real and complex, and the 20th century has turned 
to functions in several variables, real and complex. In the realm of complex 
variables, the 20th century has been largely working on themes set by the 
19th century, some themes beguiling and pleasant, others harsh and un- 
pleasant. Automorphic functions in several variables are intriguing, be- 
guiling, and pleasant; singularities of functions or of manifolds of several 
variables are harsh, forbidding, and most unpleasant. Which of the two 
topics will last longer, and perdure into the 21st century is another ques- 
tion; probably the unpleasant one. 
For both real and complex variables, the 19th century molded the general 
concept of function and also created large classes of special functions, but 
there was a difference between the cases of real and complex variables. 
In the case of real variables the molding of the general concept of functions 
and the creation of special classes of functions proceeded independently 
from each other and were performed by different authors, even though 
both activities received their motivations from mechanics and physics. 
In the case of complex variables, however, the molding of the concept of 
function and the creation of special classes of functions were proceeding 
in close intimacy and interaction, with Bernhard Riemann being the chief 
architect of the dual enterprise. 
It is this which made the 19th century into a n  era of analytic functions 
par excellence. Also, in memory of this, the word "Funktionentheorie" in 
the title of German books used to indicate, and still indicates, the theme 
* Supported in part by a grant from the United States Air Force Office of Scientific 
Research. 
3 
4 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
of functions of complex variables, and of no other; it being understood that 
functions of a real variable will expressly identify themselves as such. Thus, 
C. Carathtodory, a leading 20th century master of the theory of functions 
of a real variable, published in 1918 a large "Theorie der Funktionen einer 
reellen Veranderlichen." But, as recently as in 1950, a treatise of his on 
complex variables appeared under the title "Funktionentheorie," tout court. 
I t  is true that the treatise was put through publication posthumously. But 
this title was undoubtedly so found in the author's papers, and would have 
most likely become Carathtodory's own, had he lived, 
The 19th century also created an in-between topic, namely the topic of 
the "Poisson summatioll formuIa" so-called (this appellation is a 20th 
century coinage), which seems to fall between real and complex variables, 
combining the two with each other and with the analytic theory of arith- 
metical forms and of algebraic numbers. Among other things, the Poisson 
summation formula generates, by way of "theta relations," a very remark- 
able cIass of special functions. These are the so-called zeta functions of 
number theory, algebraic geometry, and the theory of automorphic functions. 
When viewed by themselves, zeta functions appear to be rather isolated 
objects of analysis, but the Poisson summation formula as a substantive 
background links them with analysis at large. 
In a very broad sense, the Poisson summation formula is the key to all 
and any "dualities" and "reciprocities" in mathematics, a ~ l d  hence also in 
mathematical physics. Dirichlet injected the formula into number theory, 
for all time to come, when he demonstrated that, by using the formula, it 
becomes "child's pIay" to fully derive the reciprocity law for Gaussian 
sums, over which Gauss had labored long and hard. The formula is also 
the natural setup for dealing with the remainder term in so-called lattice 
point problems for euclidean space. Finally, and most gloriously, Erich 
Hecke used the formula, and oi~ly this formula, for the derivation of the 
Riemann-Hecke functional equation for zeta functions over algebraic 
number fields. 
Regrettably, there is no book as yet dealing with the derivation of various 
known zeta f~~nct ions by means of the Poisson summation formula. 
Antiquity. The Greeks, mathematicians and others, did not have the 
concept of a (mathematical) function in their thinking. It is not possible t o  
discern in the body of Greek mathematics something that could be inter- 
preted to be an adumbration of the notion of a function y = f (x)  as we 
know it today, or, at least, as it is discernible in the mathematics of the 16th 
and 17th centuries, say. 
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The Greeks did, of course, have some familiarity with categories of 
cognition such as "correspondence," "dependence," "mapping," even 
"binary relation," which enter into our present-day notion of a function. 
But the mere occurrence of such categories does not yet make for the 
presence of functions. Even the occurrence of assertions or conclusions 
which can be readily translated or transliterated into functional relations is 
not yet enough. It is still necessary, and this is decisive, that something 
also be "done" with those functions, or with the trains of reasoning corre- 
sponding to them, that is, that some kind of "mathematical" operations 
be performed with, or on, those fi~nctions, or with the trains of reasoning 
that "stand in" for functions. Now, it is this kind of "operational" activity, 
or only attitude, which it is difficult to discern in the realm of Greek thought, 
mathematical or other. 
Thus, although the Greeks - and, in fact, Aristotle single-handedly - 
created the syllogistic aspects of our modes of formal deduction, they never 
broke through to a satisfactory conception of "relation," binary or 12-nary, 
reflexive, invertive, or correlative. Book 5 of Aristotle's Metaplzysics is a 
dictionary of some basic philosophical terms, and among others it has a 
lengthy entry on "relation" (pros ti). But the content of the entry is so 
embarrassingly ordinary that philosophers and logicians in general are not 
aware of it, and only "all-inclusive" commentaries of Aristotle take note 
of it. And of an algebra of relations, as begun by Leibniz (1646-1716) and 
insisted upon by the American mathematician-philosopher Charles Sanders 
Peirce (1839-1914), there is hardly a trace among the Greeks. Furthermore, 
historians of logic have been recently asserting, even heatedly, that the 
Greeks remained creative in the field of logic even after Aristotle, and that, 
specifically, some principles of our "modern" propositional modes of 
implication were already discovered by some of the Stoics [ I ,  pp. 6-81. 
But, here again, of propositional fiazctions, that is of propositional schemes 
that involve "all" or "any," there is no trace [2, p. 321. 
Even the great Archimedes does not have functions in his thinking, 
meaningfully that is. Isaac Newton's treatise on mechanics [3] is ostensibly 
composed in the style of Archimedes, that is, in terms of curves and geo- 
metric paths, all without coordinates. Yet Newton's treatise is, by its 
internal direction, function-oriented, whereas the work of Archimedes is not. 
For instance, Newton views the tangent to  a pIanetary orbit at a point as 
the limiting position of a secant through this fixed point and a variable 
neighboring point of the orbit, meaning that he performs the operation of 
differentiation on "hidden" coordinate functions. Archimedes however 
adheres to the euclidean definition that a tangent to a curve is a straight line 
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which globally intersects the curve at one point only, and he pretends to 
observe this definition even in his essay on (archimedean) spirals r = cf3 
(polar coordinates). Archimedes is aware of the fact that any straight line 
in the plane of the spiral intersects it in more than one point, and he ap- 
parently observes the euclidean requirement only half-globally, for a half- 
coil of the curve. But there is no tendency in the essay to make the require- 
ment a properly local one. 
Furthermore, Archimedes' law of the lever is a "conservation law" for 
the rotational momentum 
(1) f(p,E) = p a  1 ,  
(1 =length of the arm, p = the s~~spended weight), meaning that 
However, Archimedes could not envisage "operationally" a "function" 
like (I). Thus, he was unable to conceptualize the physical datum of rota- 
tional momentum, and he had to express the equality (2) in the euclidean 
(that is, Greek) manner as a proportion 
p1 : p2 = I ,  : I I .  
This explanation of the intellectual limitation of Archimedes is seemingly 
different from, yet in fact very cognate with, our previous explanation that 
Archimedes was unable to conceptualize a product Iike p I as a ring opera- 
tion within the semi-ring of positive real numbers [4, pp. 181 ff.]. 
We note that this ring operation was first introduced by Descartes at the 
head of his La Gkofizktrie (1637), and that the first formal definition of a 
mechanical momentum was given by Newton in his treatise. Newton 
introduced not the rotational momentum but the translutional momentum. 
He called it "quantity of motion" and characterized it as the product of 
mass and velocity [4, p. I], or rather as a bilinear functional on the cartesian 
product of mass and velocity. 
Middle Ages. In the Middle Ages there were some stirrings of the kind 
of analysis in which functions are domiciled, and the most function-oriented 
medieval mathematician was Nicole Oresme (1323-1382). He devised a ver- 
sion of graphing for which he is renowned, and he also envisaged exponen- 
tiation a' (for fractional exponents r = p/q)  [5, pp. 288-2951, These two 
achievements, when taken together, certainly suggest functions of the kind 
that occur in later developments. Oswald Spengler in his Decline of the West 
(1922-1924) - whatever the shortcomings of the work as a whole - 
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rightly insists that with Oresme's anticipation of functions something very 
new was added to the classical Greek mathematics of Euclid, Archimedes, 
and Apollonius. 
Since the second half of the 19th century, Oresme's standing as a harbinger 
of analysis in general and of the concept of function in particular has been 
steadily on the rise. But, on hard tangible evidence, it seems impossible to 
assay what Oresme's effect on subsequent developments of analysis actually 
was. His works were known in the 15th and 16th centuries 16, p. 881. But he, 
or his mathematical works, are apparently never mentioned by name in the 
decisive 17th or 18th centuries [6, p. 1651, and may have been unfamiliar 
to them. It can only be recorded that in the 19th century the Great Reha- 
bilitation of the Middle Ages, which had become a state of mind, somehow 
remembered Oresme and began to restore his achievements one by one. 
Renaissance. It  may be said that in the 16th and 17th centuries almost 
anything mathematics achieved stimulated the eventual emergence of 
functions. Thus, the rise of formulaic algebraic expressions undoubtedly 
contributed to the rise of functions which can be given by such expressions. 
Also, the intensive preoccupation with logarithms could not but lead to 
the introduction of the pair of functions (log x, ex} and to the realization 
that these functions are inverses of each other, Finally, trigonometrists may 
have sensed that the addition theorem 
sin (x 5 y) = sin x cos y + cos x sin y 
is a "functional equation" by which to define sin x and cos x for angles 
greater than 360"; this suggested itself to me when reading the great work 
of von Braunmiihl 171, although I would not be able to adduce a specific 
reference. 
It can be said even more affirmatively that the analysts of the 17th century, 
certainly beginning with Descartes and Fermat, always had functions in 
their thinking, even though they spoke of "curves," as they had to. (The 
term "function," a dictionary word since the 16th century, began to be 
used as a mathematical term only in 1694, in a publication of Leibniz.) 
Thus, Fermat certainly dealt with functions in his famous paper on maxima 
and minima, which he composed sometime between 1629 and 1638 (and in 
which the word "analyst" occurs several times). He considers a general 
"parabola" 
Y = P(x), 
in which P(x) is a polynomial of any degree, and he asserts that its maxima 
and minima occur among those points for which 
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Now, Fermat does not actually form a derivative by a limiting process, 
and he does not express his condition as we have just done; but he applies 
an operational procedure which ought to delight an algebraist of today. 
He replaces the variable x by x + E, forms the expansion 
and asserts that the maxima and minima are among those points for 
which 
[8, pp. 183 ff.]; 15, p. 3821. The algebraic purity of the procedure is com- 
mendable, but there is a price on it. With this derivation of his criterion (4), 
Fermat cannot properly prove his assertion, and he knows it. And so he 
exorcizes the ghost of (the "algebraist") Diophantus (ca. 250 A.D.) to stand 
mathematical surety for him that his assertion is all right. The editors of the 
collected works of Fermat were apparently puzzled by this invocation of the 
shades of Diophantus, and in a terse footnote they seem to make Diophantus 
into an analyst for the nonce. Moritz Cantor, however, observes perspica- 
ciously that to Fermat "even infinitesimal considerations were emanations 
of number theoretic conceptionalizations" [9, p. 8581. Yet as late as 1934 
an editor of a German translation of Fermat's essay most gratuitously 
remarks that "Diophantus employs the word 'approximation procedure' 
(Arithmetica, v. 14 and 17) in a sense different from Fernlat's" [lo, p. 441. 
Contit~uity. Leibniz was apparently the first knowingly to associate with 
the notion of function the attribute of continuity. This was a meaningful 
"first," and we are going to make some remarks on the meaning of it. It must 
be stated however that, in the main, Leibniz reflected on this association 
philosophically rather than mathematically, so that working mathematicians 
probably did not become aware of this association, directly, that is. In- 
directly they may have indeed been influenced by it, but it w o ~ ~ l d  be difficult 
to establish this. Specifically, it would not be easy to trace back Cauchy's pre- 
occupation with the phenomenon of continuity of functions in working 
mathematics to Leibniz' reflections, over a century before, on continuity 
of functions in natural and other philosophy. 
We must return to the Greeks for a proper beginning. Greek rationality 
was aware of continuity from the first [ I l l ,  and the Greeks had a standard 
word for L L ~ ~ n t i n u ~ ~ ~ ' 7  (sytzecl ks), which, literally, can best be rendered by 
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"holding together," or "interlocking." The word occurs already in Homer 
in both a spatial and a temporal sense, and in its temporal sense, that is, 
when referring to the flow of time, its meaning is already semi-figurative, 
foreshadowing the connotations of meaning of today. 
Centuries later the word appears, even profusely, as a technicaI term in 
Aristotle's Physics, in the kind of technical meani~lg which it might have in  a 
scientific or philosophical context of today. The meaning of syizeclzks in 
Aristotle might not be exactly the same as the meaning of cofztinuous is 
today, but in a cursory reading of the Plzysics the translation of syizechks by 
coiztinuo~~s is good enough. 
As against this, there is the remarkable fact, which cannot be sufficiently 
stressed or overinterpreted, that Greek mathematics proper, that is, the 
Greek nlatheinatics as it is known from the works of Euclid, Archimedes, 
Apollonius, Heron, Ptolemy, etc., never, but never, states, asserts, suggests, 
or negates that something in mathematics is synechks in a technical mean- 
ing of the term, nor does it ever take recourse to an obvious verbal equivalent 
of it. 
In the Pl1ysics, however, sytzechb, when used technically, occurs in a 
manner which would be recognizably mathematical nowadays. When 
occurring there, it is intended to describe, in rather invoIved thought patterns 
of Aristotle, the essential mathematical feature of the linear continuum 
(- m, co) of today, namely its "completeness" in the sense of Dedekind 
and Cantor. Aristotle has great dificulties separating denseness from 
completeness, but even professional mathematicians in the 17th and 18th 
centuries might have had such difficulties too. 
This is all the continuity that Aristotle is aware of. He never mentioils 
"topological" continuity, that is, continuity of a function or of a "mapping" 
of any kind, except that he is aware of the fact (which he labors most re- 
petitively) that in a triziform  notion x = ct the continuity structures of the 
spatial continuum (x) and the temporal continuum ( t )  are isomorphic. 
The absence of topological continuity from Western thought lasted very 
long. In fact, topological continuity is discernible for the first time only in 
Leibniz, not in straight working mathematics, but in many expostulations 
of something which Leibniz called a Law of Continuity ([ex contittui). This 
Law was not really a hypothesis or principle of the metaphysics of Leibniz, 
but rather a leitmotif of it. Among other things the Law asserted, or only 
implied, that the data and features of the universe are all continuous, whether 
asserted individually, in mutual correlation, or in functional dependence. 
Thus, anybody so disposed may detect in Leibniz insights of the following 
kind: the rudiments of a conceptioli of space as a Hausdorff neighborhood 
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space, together with the corresponding definition of continuous (function or) 
mapping in terms of neighborhoods; the rudiments of the fact that for a 
system of differentia1 and other functional equations the solution usually 
depends continuously on initial conditions and other parameters; the 
rudiments of the hypothesis that the mathematical laws of physics are 
constant in space and time, or at most vary continuously; the rudiments 
of the law that biological species evolve continuousIy; etc. 
After Leibniz, among philosophers and mathematician-philosophers, 
the greatest proponent of a universal law of continuity was C. S. Peirce, 
whom we have already mentioned above. Like some other 19th century 
philosophers before him (J. F. Herbarth, G. T. Fechner), he spoke not of 
continuity but of synechism, and he did not acknowledge any indebtedness 
to Leibniz. Peirce was familiar with the work of Georg Cantor and with the 
methodology of working mathematics, and through the length of his 
philosophical career he endeavored to find a conception and principle of 
continuity that would apply to mathematics and ontology both. In this he 
utterly failed, as he was bound to, because no ontology worthy of its name 
is a mere "extension" of mathematics, and because in mathematics con- 
tinuity may vary with the context and purpose, even freely so, whereas in 
ontology proper this freedom is greatly curtailed if it is present at all. 
Piecewise Analytic F~nlctiotzs. In the 18th century, working mathe- 
maticians of the stature of Euler, d5Alembert, and Lagrange were trying 
to find out what functions are or ought to be, and how and when they are 
"given," and mathematicians even began to classify firnctions, somewhat 
ingenuously at times. Somehow their findings were uncertain, ambiguous, 
and inconcIusive, so much so that even historical accounts of them do not 
quite agree with each other, or, at any rate, try to be as circumspect as 
they can. There is a reason for this. In the 18th century "there was a near- 
perfect, richly yielding, fusion of mathematics and mechanics" [4, p. 71, 
so that a mathematical function was not only an object of mathematics, but, 
by equal priority, also an object of mechanics, and thus had to satisfy 
needs and expectations of both in equal measure. For instance, it seems that 
in the thinking of Lagrange an analytic function was, in equal parts, 
a function likely to occur in mathematical analysis and a function likely to 
occur in a typical situation of his Mgcanique analytique. Now a rather 
simple situation arises if one throws a ball against a wall from which it 
bounces back. The coordinates of the ball, as functions of time, cease to 
be analytic at the time point of impact but are analytic in the adjoining time 
intervals. Thus, Lagrange would have had difficulty in firmly deciding 
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whether an analytic function of t has to be indeed analytic throughout, or 
may be only piecewise anaIytic in finitely many adjoining intervals 
[4, pp. 287-2881. 
At first glance, the formation of a functional object by putting together 
pieces of analytic or other "well-defined" functions may appear to be, 
mathematically, a makeshift operation, an ingenuous one. But the 19th 
century learned to respect, explore, and exploit such formations; and in the 
20th century there would hardly be any topology if it were not for simplicia1 
and related decompositions and approximations. 
Trigonometric Series. Amidst all its uncertainties about the nature of a 
function, the 18th century somehow managed to make the capital discovery 
- which, in a way, has been unmatched since - that functions of a very 
"general" class can be represented in the form 
In the early 19th century, Fourier greatly emphasized what had been 
known before, that for a given f(x) the corresponding "Fourier coefficients" 
in the expansion (5) usually have the values 
(6) 1 " f (x)cos rrxrlx, L,, = J- !(x)  sin nxdr ,  
and he also greatly emphasized that "any" functionf(x) has a representation 
(5), even if the function is absohtrnerzt arbitraire. 
As it turned out, this absoliiment arbitraire was a great "challenge" 
(ti la Toynbee), and, in a sense, the creation of the theory of functions of a 
real variable was a "response" to this challenge. 
Firstly, Dirichlet made the following contributions (1829-1 837) : 
(i) He gave his famed "definition" of a truly "arbitrary" numerical 
function y = f ( x ) ,  as a "general" correspondence from x to y. 
(ii) He introduced - perhaps for the first time -a  specific class of 
functions of a real variable to a speciJic purpose. It was the class of piecewise 
monotone functions; and Dirichlet established the fact that for such a 
function the Fourier series converges at all points. 
(After the rise of set theory, towards the end of the 19th century, these 
functions of Dirichlet "engendered" functions of bounded variation and 
also rectifiable curves.) 
Secondly, Riemann made the following contributions (1854, published 
1867) : 
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(iii) He was the first to create a precise class of integrable functions, 
so as to be able t o  define the Fourier coefficients (6) .  Furthermore, in pre- 
senting his criterion for (Riemann) integrability, he prominently used, 
probably for the first time, the notion of "a necessary and sufficient" con- 
dition, literally so. 
(iv) He sharply distinguished between a tr.igorzor??etric series 
and a Fourier series. For the latter the coefficients {a,, b,,} are given by the 
formulas (6 )  by means of some function f(x), but in the first case no such 
formulas are assumed at all. 
(v) For a Fourier series he created the concept of "Iocalization" of 
convergence (and he also conceived the Riemann-Lebesgue lemma), thus 
creating the concept of a "local" property for mathematics at large. 
(vi) For any trigonometric series, with 
he introduced the sum function 
0) a,] cos nx + b,, sin nx F(s)  = " a  4 o x2 - 
I , =  1 ?1 
and treated it as a present-day Schwartz distribution of level 2. That is, 
he introduced "testing" functions" @(x) and "defined" 
(I venture to remark that, long before Schwartz, such "distributions" were 
introduced by myself as "generalized" Fourier transforms; see [12, Ch. VI].) 
Thirdly, and very decisively, Georg Cantor, after studying closely the 
work of Riemann, added the following proposition: 
(vii) If the trigonometric series (7) is convergent, and to the limit value 0, 
at  all points of the interval -n 5 x 5 n, then the series is identically 0, 
meaning that a,, = b, = 0, n = 0, 1 ,2 ,3 , .  . 
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This last proposition was a very technical statement from working 
mathematics having no unusual features at all and yet it had the following 
momentous consequences. After proving the proposition, Cantor asked 
himself whether, in the hypothesis, the convergence to 0 has to indeed 
be known for all points x of the interval, or whether there might not be in 
the interval an "exceptional" set Efor  the points of which nothing is stipu- 
lated. Cantor found, successively, that the following sets are exceptional: 
(a set consisting of) a single point; a finite number of points; a set having 
a single accumulation point (and Cantor defines an accumulation point 
for the occasion); a set having finitely many accumulation points; a set E 
whose set of accumulation points E' has a single accumulation point or 
finitely many acc~~~nulation p ints; etc. 
This led Cantor to the conception of a transfinite ordinal number, and 
thence to the conception and theory of pointsets and also of general aggre- 
gates; and the world of thought, of any thought, has not been the same 
since. 
Ortlrogonal Sysfetns. The trigonometric representation (5) of f(x) is an 
expansion of f(x) into an orthogonal system, and it is remarkable that 
mathematicians did not realize this feature of trigonometric functions for 
a century or longer. The 19th century discovered many other complete 
orthogonal systems among various families of special functions, functions 
of Bessel, Lam&, Lagrange, Laguerre, Hermite, Jacobi, Heine, Gegenbauer, 
and others. It was discovered for each such system separately that genera1 
functions can be expanded in terms of it, and it was even known, after a 
fashion, that every system was a complete set of eigenfullctions associated 
with an elliptic differential equation. But somehow in the 19th century these 
separate facts were not properly linked up;  the accumulated knowledge was 
broad and eclectic rather than compact and systematic and did not contribute 
to the general theory of functions of a real variable. Riemann, for instance, 
took no notice of the special functions of this kind (except for hypergeomet- 
ric functions, which, however, were holomorphic functions for him), and 
there does not seem to be a single "Riemann formula" about them. 
But after the turn of the century the study of ortlzogonality sudde~lly 
became a serious mathematical occupation. Its achievements were spear- 
headed by the Riesz-Fischer theorem, which was a great triumph of the 
newly conceived Lebesgue integral, and above all by Hilbert's spectral 
decomposition of a bounded self-adjoint operator in Hilbert space. This in 
turn led to L,-spaces, Banach spaces, and functional analysis. 
Early functional analysis in the 19th century distinguished between 
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"fu~lctions," "functionals," "operators", etc., as if they were entirely 
heterogeneous objects [13, passim]. But the 20th gradually realized that 
they are all functions in a broad sense, if a function y = f(x) is conceived 
to be a mapping from a general set X : {x) into a general set Y : {y), with 
no relations between the sets X, Y stipulated. Logicians maintain that some 
such broad definition of a function had already been anticipated by the 
logician Gottlob Frege in the 1870's. Maybe so. But even if this was so, 
it is most unlikely that working mathematiciarls were aware of it, or in- 
fluenced by it. Rather, they arrived at their insight by their own "hard" way. 
Riernatzrz Surfaces. 111 the realm of complex variables, the pioneering 
achievement of Bernhard Riemann (1826-1866) was to  characterize certain 
classes of functions, which are initially give11 in the complex plane in terms 
of certain expressions, by overall properties of the functions on suitable 
compact Riemann surfaces, or, as later developme~lts expIicated it, on the 
universal covering surfaces of the compact ones. A leading case, in which 
the universal covering surface need not be envisaged, is the following. 
Consider an equation 
in which P(w, z) is an irreducible polyllomial of the two variables w and z, 
where z varies over the Gaussian sphere S. The solution w = w(z) of the 
equation is an iz-valued algebraic function (n is the degree of the polyno~nial 
in w), and with it we can form the class of f i~mtions 
for all possible rational functions R(w, z). Now, Riemann characterizes 
the class Fl as follows. He forms the tt-sheeted Riemann surface T over S, 
on which w(z) is properly defined and memorplzic, and he coilsiders the 
class F2 of all those functions which are defined and meromorphic on T. 
Then, 
F2 - F , .  
It is easy to see that F, c F2, and the b~~rderl  of the assertioll is that also 
F2 c F, ; for a present-day proof see [ I d ,  p. 1551, and note that this proof 
does not proceed by mere "tall<ing" and "cerebration" but also by a re- 
course to the Lagrange interpolation formula. Also, if for some element 
t (z )  in F2 and some z, in S over which T is not ramified, the n functional 
elements of f(z) over z, are different from each other, then w(z) is also a 
rational function of {t(z), 2 ) .  
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On one occasion Felix Klein gave an evaluation of Riematln's originaIity 
which mixed much admiration with a dose of ir~compreheilsion [15, pp. 
1 18-1 191. We translate it thus: 
Riernann invariably investigates functions thus: at  the head of the investigation 
he places their defining properties, and from these properties he ded~rced every- 
thing else, especially the formulas holding for the fi~nctions. 
This procedure of Riemann appears difficult only aslong as it does not lean on any 
concrete knowledge. As soon as the latter takes place [that is, the leaning], it appears 
most peculiarly simple and transparent. 
We c o ~ ~ l d  also express this in the following way: Riemann's procedure is scienti- 
fically excellent, b i ~ t  pedagogically unusable [trrrDrotrchbnt~]. One must not begin 
with it, but bring it at  the end. A first exanlple of this Riemannian treatment is his 
theory of abelian integrals; he defines them as functions which by a closed circ~un- 
ambulation on the Riemann surface vary only by an additive constant. A second 
topic which Riemann treats in this way is l ~ n e a r  differential equations. . . . 
According to Riemann, in the theory of linear differential equations, one considers 
sirnuItaneously 11 fi~nctions pl, . . . , y,,, which, on the Riemann surface, experience 
linear transformations after encircling certain "points of ramification" a s  also 
closed circumambulations. 
Klein's criticism of Riemann, even if limited to "pedagogy," was not 
prophetically inspired because in the second half of the 20th century, a 
hundred years after Riemann's death; his "procedure" is flourislzing with a 
vengeance. There is an expanding mathematical "industry" which for any 
compact complex manifold - algebraic or not, in one or several variables - 
conceives and examines all sorts of classes of objects, scalar or tensorial, 
tangential or fibral, holomorphic or meromorphic, "periodic" or auto- 
morphic; and generally each of the classes has some kind of filzits basis, 
additive, multiplicative, or algebraic. Also, from time to time the name of 
Riemann illjects itself into the context. 
Analytic Contin~intion. Riemann showed little interest in "arbitrary" 
analytic functions, that is, in functions not "generated" in some algebraic 
manner from the complex variable z .  He knew, even for arbitrary functions, 
that their analytic continuation is t~nique, but he did not make mucl-i of 
the fact. Thus, Rielnann never formulated the statement, of which he was 
undoubtedly aware, that a holomorphic (or mesomorphic) function in a 
dolllain D of the complex plane - for instance, in a disc -gives rise by 
analytic conti~luation along paths in the complex plane to a tlrzique maxitnal 
Rieinann (covering) surface 6 over the colnplex plane into which f(z) can be 
analytically continued (and similarly for the Gaussian sphere instead of 
the complex plane). We will call this analytic col~tinuatioil of f(z) froin D 
into 6 its "Weierstrass continuatio11" and denote it on fi by f"(z). 
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As we have already noted before in 1161, there seem to be some misunder- 
standings as to the meaning and extent of the feature of trniq~retzess with which 
the Weierstrass continuation is endowed. The fact is that this uniqueness is 
much less "absoIute" than sometimes vaguely taken for granted, and we 
are going to explain what we mean by this. Our present explanation will be 
somewhat different from and more detailed than the one given in [16]. 
Let D, be a bounded simply connected domain in the z-plane, and D2 
such a domain in the w-plane; Iet 
be a one-one holomorphic mapping from Dl  to D,; let ,f2(w) be a holo- 
morphic function on D,, and let f,(z) - f2(4(z)) be its preirnage on Dl. If 
we form the two ensembles 
then (8) is also a holomorphic transformation of the first ensemble into the 
second, in an obvious sense. We now form the Weierstrass continuation 
of each of the functions f,, f,. This gives rise to two "larger" ensembles 
and, contrary to what one might vaguely expect, these two larger ensembles 
need no longer be holomorphic images of each other, either by the mapping 
(8) itself, or by any other mapping. One can easily construct counter- 
examples, and we now choose the following. 
Let Dl be the disc 
Let D, be the interior of a Jordan curve 3, no arc of which is real-analytic, 
and let 
Then 
By known properties of conformal mapping, the function 4(z) has no 
analytic continuation at all, so that 
But f2(w) = w can be co~ltinued analytically from D, into all of C1(w), 
so that 
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Now there is no conformal mapping from the disc (1 1) into all of C1, and 
thus the two ensembles (lo), as given by (12) and (13), cannot be homeo- 
morphic. 
The concli~sion to be drawn from this counterexample is this: that the 
Weierstrass continuation process does not at all apply to an "abstract" 
ensemble 
in which D is at1 "abstract" Riemann surface and f a holomorphic function 
on it. But if one does start out with an  abstract ensemble (14), then the 
process does become applicable if there is given an additional Riemailn 
surface S (which in the "classical" case of Weierstrass is the complex plane 
or the Gaussian sphere, but which, in fact, can be quite general) and a 
holomorphic wzbranched mapping of D into S. In fact, if we denote this 
mapping by g, the11 the process applies not to the ensemble (14) but to the 
greater ensemble 
and the assertion is that this greater ensemble has a continuation 
which is both maximal and urziq~le. Also, the symbol f in (15) need not 
represent a single holomorphic filnction, but may represent an assemblage 
of holomorplzic functions, or, in fact, of scalar or tensorial holomorphic 
objects, and may also s~lbsume mappings illto some complex spaces, which 
need not have anything to do with the fixed space S. Also, the scalar or 
tensorial objects need not be strictly holomorphic, but they may also be 
merornorphic, provided they are so both in (15) and (16). 
All this follows readily by adapting the reasoning in Chapter 1 of Weyl's 
book [ I d ] .  It also applies to the case of several complex variables, if D, S 
are equidimellsional and they and their extensions are assumed to be arcwise 
connected. I t  should be noted that for n >= 2 general compIex spaces like 
D, S need not be separable, and if they are indeed llot separable then 
u~icoulltably many sheets of d may be lying over the same points of S. 
If however D and S happen to be separable, then b will be so too, a ~ l d  
there will be only countably many sheets of d spread over S. 
We have noted before that the object f in (15) may subsume general 
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holomorphic mappings into unspecified complex spaces. This suggests that 
it ought to be possible to dispense with the "special" unbranched mapping 
g into an equidimensional space S and to put some "general" restriction 
in its place. Now, we have found in [I61 that it suffices instead to demand 
that the totality of objects {f ) separates points on D in the following sense. 
We assume that in any holomorphic coordinate system around any point 
of D, every object f is characterized by a set of components each of which is 
a holomorphic function in the given coordinates. Now, take any two points 
P,  P' on D, different or not, a coordinate neighborhood N : {z) of P, and a 
coordinate neighborhood N' : {z') of P', such that there exists a one-one 
holomorphic mapping z' = +(z) from N to N'. Take all f~ui~ctional elements 
{ f(zf)} in N', and form their transforms {g(z)) r { f (@(z))} in N. Now, our 
hypothesis is that whenever the totality of elements i g ( z ) )  is the same, 
object by object, as the totality of elements { f ( z ) ) ,  then the two points P, P' 
are identical, the coordinate systems {z), {z') are identical, and 4(z) is the 
identity mapping. 
With this definition we proved in [I61 the following proposition. 
It follows $ - o m  mere analyticity of tlze data tlzat any ensemble { D ,  f) 
whatsoever always has maxi~nal extensions {b, 71, but there m e  usz~ally 
Inany sziclz. I f  Izowever tlze etzsemble {D, f) has the separatiotz property 
just described, aizcl if we consider extelzsiotzs {D, 7 )  with tlze same seyaration 
property, tlzen the maximal extension is unique. 
For complex dimension n 2 2 at1 interesting case of non uniqueiless 
can be exhibited by use of the Hopf blow-up as follows. Let V" be a compact 
complex manifold, say algebraic, and let Po be a point on it. Let D be the 
manifold V" - Po (that is, V" minus the one point Po), and let f represent 
all meromorphic functions on V" which are non sing~llar at Po. The "natural" 
maximal extension is B = V", and the resulting {B, f) is indeed maximal 
because B, being compact, is non continuable. However, instead of adding 
merely the point Po we can also add, by performing a Hopf blow-LLP, a 
projective space P"-I of n - 1 complex dimensions. The resulting co~nplex 
manifold 
is again compact, and there is a corresponditlg maximal extension 
in which F(P) arises from f(P) by assigning to  all points P of P"-I the 
constant value f(PO). In this new ~naxin~al  extension, {f') no longer separates 
points. 
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We remark that a quotient of holomorphic functions at Po can be similarly 
extended from a neighborhood of Po to a neighborhood ofPn-I by extending 
numerator and denominator separately, so that it was not even necessary 
to exclude from the class ( f )  meromorphic functions on V" that are non 
regular at Po.  
If now we couple this remark with the observation that the Hopf blow-up 
of an algebraic variety is again algebraic [ I T ] ,  we arrive at the following 
insight which ought to have a sobering effect on any devotee of functional 
analysis of our times. A compact complex matzifold V", of complex dimension 
n 2 2, even when algebraic, cannot be "completely characterized" by the 
assemblage of (holon~orphic and) meroinorplzic functions on it, even if to the 
scalar. functions all possible tensorial functions (that is, tangential vector 
bundles) be added. For n 2 3, even non tangential holomorphic vector bundles 
may be added (see [18, pp. 192-1951). 
A Parting Tho~~ght .  The statement just made and its rationale exemplify 
a developing trend that bids fair to take over and prevail in geometrically 
oriented analysis for decades to come. During nearly a hundred years, since 
after 1870, geometrically controlled analysis was searching for and striving 
to articulate "harmonies," "symmetries," "homogeneities"; and among 
cognoscenti, the credal inspiration for this mathematical state of mind drew 
from something called the Erlanger Program, whatever that was. Mighty 
achievements ensued: the theories of Lie groups, Lie algebras, symmetric 
spaces, even, in part, of automorphic functions among such. And yet, all 
along, something new and different was burgeoning, something that tried 
to overcome, or at least to make itself independent of, the "retrogressive" 
seeking of bigger and better symmetries and homogeneities. All truly 
exciting achievements in analytical and differential topology of recent years, 
beginning with the pioneering efforts of Marston Morse decades ago, have 
been of this novel kind, and they seem to be a truer fulfillment of the general 
aspirations of our century than that which had preceded. And there is 
wisdom to such aspirations. For instance, in the realm of several complex 
variables, nothing is less accessible to present-day analysis than a compact 
complex manifold that is simply connected and does not have a single 
complex automorphism acting upon it. Yet a "random" compact complex 
manifold is probably of this kind, and it is crying out for something to be 
done about it. 
In the second half of the 20th century, our ~rniverse of thought, feeling, 
perception, and physical and cosmological reality somehow refuses to be 
placidly "syn~metrical," and if it is symmetrical, then only in a crude surface 
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approximation with innumerably many "local" deformations (like Hopf 
blow-up) deeply affecting, if not totally destroying, whatever "pleasant" 
consequences symmetries might entail. Such are facts of our life, mathe- 
matical and other, and the oncoming generations of mathematicians will 
simply have to cope with them. 
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